Re: ufsrestore suid root not a security hole

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Ed wrote:
>         BUT, it will let you read ANY file from the tape. Including
>         root owned files such as /etc/shadow.
>
>         * Know when UNIX admins runs backups.
>         * Extract files with ufsrestore (/etc/shadow)
>         * Run Crack.
>         * Or you could be reading root's mail, CEO email ...etc,etc
[ script of reading tape deleted ]

Come on Ed.  This isn't a ufsrestore problem!  If folks can get access
to your backup tapes you are hosed.  They don't need to use ufsrestore
(setuid or not) to read them.  They can just read the raw tape if they
want to and what ever is there.  This isn't any agument against
ufsrestore -- it's an argument to physically protect your backup tapes.

        geoff

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• In reply to: Eduardo E. Silva: "Re: ufsrestore suid root not a security hole"
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